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Abstract
Face morphing attacks have raised critical concerns as
they demonstrate a new vulnerability of Face Recognition
Systems (FRS), which are widely deployed in border control
applications. The face morphing process uses the images
from multiple data subjects and performs an image blending
operation to generate a morphed image of high quality. The
generated morphed image exhibits similar visual character-
istics corresponding to the biometric characteristics of the
data subjects that contributed to the composite image and
thus making it difficult for both humans and FRS, to detect
such attacks. In this paper, we report a systematic investi-
gation on the vulnerability of the Commercial-Off-The-Shelf
(COTS) FRS when morphed images under the influence of
ageing are presented. To this extent, we have introduced
a new morphed face dataset with ageing derived from the
publicly available MORPH II face dataset, which we refer
to as MorphAge dataset. The dataset has two bins based on
age intervals, the first bin - MorphAge-I dataset has 1002
unique data subjects with the age variation of 1 year to 2
years while the MorphAge-II dataset consists of 516 data
subjects whose age intervals are from 2 years to 5 years. To
effectively evaluate the vulnerability for morphing attacks,
we also introduce a new evaluation metric, namely the Fully
Mated Morphed Presentation Match Rate (FMMPMR), to
quantify the vulnerability effectively in a realistic scenario.
Extensive experiments are carried out by using two differ-
ent COTS FRS (COTS I and COTS II - Neurotechnology)
to quantify the vulnerability with ageing. Further, we also
evaluate five different Morph Attack Detection (MAD) tech-
niques to benchmark their detection performance with age-
ing.
1. Introduction
Facial characteristics have been well explored for iden-
tifying and verifying individuals and numerous biometrics
system have been deployed in operational applications for
many years [21, 23]. The preference towards face based
biometrics systems is founded on multiple factors such
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Figure 1: Illustration of the influence of ageing on face mor-
phing
as ease of capture of facial characteristic without invasive
imaging, capturing at a stand-off distance both in semi-
cooperative (voluntary identification/verification) and unco-
operative scenarios (surveillance) [27, 5, 26]. While many
of the breakthrough articles detailing iris and vein recog-
nition systems have shown impeccable accuracy with very
low false accepts and false rejects, those systems suffer
from highly constrained image capturing processes. In or-
der to reach the performance of such iris and vein recogni-
tion systems, face biometrics has seen benefits from recent
algorithmic advancements, which was focused on features
that have been engineered in a robust manner [31, 30, 6],
and pre-processing that has been improvised [35] by in-
cluding end-to-end learning using Deep Neural Networks
(DNN) even in large scale applications [26, 39].
Such attractive and inherent advantages of the face
modality have led to a wider deployment of Face Recog-
nition Systems (FRS) in passport issuance processes, visa
management, identity management and Automated Border
Control (ABC). Despite the high accuracy and convenience
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of face biometrics, FRS systems are impeded by various
factors such as ageing [34, 22], partial face availability [22]
and also imperilled by various attacks that include presen-
tation attacks (spoofing-attacks) with print, display or sili-
con mask attack instruments [32], make-up attacks [48, 2],
coverted mask attacks [8], morphing attacks [11], database
level attacks [25, 3] and comparison level attacks [18, 24].
While many of the attacks have been addressed through
mitigation measures over the period of time, we focus on
recently surfaced face morphing attacks [11, 36] in this
work. Despite some of the recent works proposed mea-
sures to mitigate these attacks through various approaches
[42, 14, 13, 36] a number of covariates are reported to im-
pact the attack detection performance. A list of covariates
impacting the performance of morphing attack detection in-
clude the techniques used to generate the morphed image
[11], the configuration of the print-scan pipeline [37], fac-
tors of age and ethnicity [40] among many other unknown
factors. With a clear introspection of the existing works, we
observe that both the FRS vulnerability and also the Morph-
ing Attack Detection (MAD) performance under variation
of age is not studied in the context of morphing attacks, de-
spite the fact that the issue was pointed out already in the
early works in this domain [40, 13].
Starting with this observation, we focus in this work
on establishing the impact of ageing on morphing attacks
by carefully studying the FRS vulnerability and MAD per-
formance of currently reported MAD algorithms under the
influence of ageing. The key motivation stems from ear-
lier works who have disentangled the impact of ageing on
face recognition systems with respect to recognition perfor-
mance [34, 22, 1] and a number of works that have pro-
posed approaches to handle the associated performance lim-
itations [34, 29, 19, 28, 1]. We therefore provide a brief
overview of impact of ageing in the subsequent section and
thereafter illustrate the impact of ageing specifically for
morphing. Further, we focus our work on investigating the
impact using the digital images alone due to two primary
factors: (i) many countries across the world allow to up-
load digital images via web-portal for passport renewal and
visa issuance, and (ii) to align our works with recent studies
focusing on digital MAD [13].
1.1. Facial Ageing
Facial ageing is a commonly observed phenotypes of hu-
man ageing, which is visibly seen. Despite the complex-
ity of understanding the characteristic changes associated
with the facial ageing, a number of works have reported
the role of skin and soft tissues and their impact on visible
changes of facial appearance [10]. Complementary works
have demonstrated the role of loss of facial bone volume to
contribute to facial appearance under ageing progress [45].
As it can be deduced, facial ageing being a complex pro-
cess involving soft tissues and skeleton structure changes, it
is influenced by many factors, such as exposure to sunlight
and body weight among others. As an additional factor,
large variations in facial ageing across individuals and eth-
nic populations can further be observed [33]. While in face
recognition, the main differences in exterior facial structure
making individuals distinguishable from each other allows
recognition analysis to achieve high identification accuracy,
a longitudinal study of the same face over a period of time
has shown to challenge the accuracy [1].
1.2. Facial Ageing and Morphing Attacks
Under the observation of complex changes of facial ap-
pearance, which bring down the recognition accuracy of
FRS unless proper measures are taken, our assertion is that
the effect and impact on morphing attacks may change. For
electronic Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs)
a typical life-cycle of 10 years is recommend [9] meaning
that the drastic changes in facial appearance must be toler-
ated as intra-class variance during that life-cycle, while up
to now the impact of morphing and its correlation with the
progressing of the potentially morphed reference image in
this life-cycle, has neither been considered nor investigated.
Initial studies on morphing attacks have demonstrated the
ability to fool a human expert (i.e. trained border guards)
with morphed facial images. The changes of facial appear-
ance, which are caused by ageing, are illustrated in Figure
1. Our assertion is to validate the impact of ageing and thus
we formulate three specific research questions:
• How vulnerable are COTS FRS when a composite morph
image is enrolled and is after a period of ageing probed
against a live image from one of the contributing sub-
jects?
• Do current Morphing Attack Detection (MAD) algo-
rithms scale-up in detecting such attacks under the influ-
ence of ageing?
• What is the impact of different alpha (or blending, mor-
phing) factors used to generate the morphed image under
the constraint of ageing?
We address each of these questions in a systematic manner
through our contributions. We focus in this work to first
establish the impact on FRS through an extensive empirical
evaluation. While a detailed study of appearance change
is more of a cognitive study, it is beyond the scope of the
current work.
1.3. Contributions of Our Work
While the hypothesis is well justified, we also note that
there exists no database with morphing and ageing accord-
ing to the current literature. With such a caveat, we focus
on first creating a database to facilitate and validate our as-
sertion.
• The first key contribution is the creation of a (moder-
ately) large-scale database of morphed faces with ageing
covariate by employing the MORPH II non-commercial
face dataset [4], which is hereafter referred as MorphAge
Database.
• We investigate the vulnerability of FRS to such attacks by
employing two widely used Commercial-Off-The-Shelf
(COTS) FRS systems. This contribution not only helps in
verifying our assertion but also validates the usefulness of
the newly created database. Further, we also investigate
the role of alpha (or blending, morphing) factor (with α =
0.3. 0.5 and 0.7) while analysing the vulnerability under
ageing.
• As a third contribution, we employ a set of recently re-
ported morphing attack detection algorithms to bench-
mark detection performance and thereby identify the im-
pediments if any.
In the rest of the paper, we first provide details on the
newly constructed database in Section 2 and in Section 3
we investigate the vulnerability of FRS using two COTS
FRS. Further, the benchmarking of morphing attack detec-
tion systems is detailed in Section 4 while the key observa-
tions and conclusions are reported in Section 5.
Table 1: Statistics of bona fide and morphed images in Mor-
phAge Database
Session Dev Training Testing Total
MorphAge-I Subset
Session 1 251 500 251 1002
(used for morphing)
Session 2 251 500 251 1002
(used for vulnerability)
Session 3 251 500 251 1002
(with age difference)
Morphed Images 1980 6614 1944 10538
MorphAge-II Subset
Session 1 130 257 129 516
(used for morphing)
Session 2 130 257 129 516
(used for vulnerability)
Session 3 130 257 129 516
(with age difference)
Morphed Images 648 2310 809 3767
(with different morphing factors)
2. MorphAge Database Construction
To effectively study the influence of ageing on face mor-
phing vulnerability and morph detection, we introduce a
new dataset, which is derived from the MORPH II non-
commercial dataset [4] that is publicly available. The
MORPH II dataset consists of a total of 55000 unique sam-
ples captured from 13000 data subjects. The images are
captured over the time span from 2003 to 2007. The age
of the subjects varies from 16 to 77 years. The dataset
consists of male and female subjects with different ethnic-
ity (African, European, Asian, Hispanic). In this work, we
choose the MORPH II dataset motivated by the large num-
ber of subjects, the quality of the captured data and the vari-
ation in age for one and the same subject across different
capture sessions.
The newly constructed MorphAge dataset is binned in
two age groups from MORPH II dataset. The first bin -
Age Group (MorphAge-I) consists of 1002 unique data sub-
jects with a gender distribution of 143 female and 859 male
subjects. For each data subject, three different samples are
chosen such that the first session corresponds to the high
quality data capture (younger age), second session corre-
sponds to the aged capture of 1-8 months from first session
and third session corresponds to the aged capture of same
subject between 1-2 years from first session. The second
bin - Age Group (MorphAge-II) is comprised of 516 unique
data subjects sub-sampled from the MORPH II dataset with
62 female and 454 male data subjects. Each data subject
was captured in three different sessions. The first session
corresponds to the high quality data capture (younger age),
the second session corresponds again to a time lapse of 1-8
months from the first session and the third session corre-
sponds to an aged capture of 2 years up to 5 years after the
first session.
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Figure 2: Illustration of sample images from newly con-
structed MorphAge dataset (a) MorphAge-I (1 year to 2
years) (b) MorphAge-II (2 years to 5 years)
2.1. MorphAge-I and MorphAge-II - Bonafide Set
In both bins, i.e. MorphAge-I and MorphAge-II, we se-
lect for each data subject three samples (one of each ses-
sion) such that the first session sample is used only to gener-
ate the morphing image, the sample from the second session
is used as bona fide sample in the morph attack detection
experiments and the third session to analyze the vulnerabil-
ity of the commercial FRS. As seen from the Figure 2, the
facial appearance changes significantly with the increasing
age which cannot be modelled geometrically or morpholog-
ically for any particular ethnicity or age group for both the
bins (MorphAge-I and MorphAge-II).
Subject 1 Subject 2Morph = 0.5Morph = 0.3 Morph = 0.7
Figure 3: Example of generated morphed images
2.2. MorphAge-I and MorphAge-II - Morphed Image Set
To generate the morphed image datasets for the subjects
represented in our newly constructed dataset, we have used
the face morph generation tool from Ferrara et al. [15]
[12], which is based on facial landmarks based warping and
weighted linear blending to generate a high quality morphed
image. We particularly, choose this technique for morphing
generation over other type of generators based on GAN [7]
by considering: (1) high quality of the generated morphed
images, in order to establish a significant threat to the tested
commercial FRS [15] (2) high quality of generated morphed
image, such that the submitted images are considered com-
pliant with the requirements in the ICAO standards and (3)
feasibility to create the morphed images with various blend-
ing and warping factors.
In this work, the morphing process is carried out between
only two data subjects by considering its use-case in a real-
life scenario where typically one criminal morphs his/her
face image with the image of an accomplice. To carefully
select the pair of images for the morphing process, we use
the COTS-I FRS, which is widely used in Automated Bor-
der Control installations. Through the FRS, a set of similar-
ity scores is obtained between the probe image of a selected
data subject against the reference images of all data sub-
jects. We then choose the pair of images that are success-
fully verified at FMR = 0.1% with high scores to retain a
high degree of similarity between two constituting subjects
for the morphed image. Additional care is exercised not
to combine data subjects with different genders and also
to separate the data subject into three independent groups
such as non-overlapping training, testing and development
sets [40, 43]. For a selected image pair, we generate three
morphed images at three different morphing (or blending)
factors α = 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 to obtain insights with regard to
the impact of ageing at different blending factors. Figure 3
shows the example of morphed face images with three dif-
ferent blending factor within our MorphAge dataset.
Table 1 presents the statistics of the generated
dataset corresponding to the two bins - MorphAge-I and
MorphAge-II. Further, in order to evaluate the MAD per-
formance, we have divided the whole datasets into three
independent and non-overlapping subsets for training, de-
velopment and testing. The training subset is used purely to
train the MAD techniques, the development subset is used
to optimize and adjust the operating threshold for the MAD
techniques and finally the testing subset is solely used to
analyze the detection performance obtained at the optimal
threshold.
3. Vulnerability Analysis
In this section, we present the vulnerability analysis of
the FRS, when confronted with the morphed images under
variation of age. To this extent, we employ two different
COTS Face Recognition Systems (FRS) namely, COTS-
I Cognitec1 and COTS-II Neurotechnology Version 10.0.
To effectively measure the vulnerability of the FRS against
morphed face samples, we set a realistic constraint that all
contributing data subjects (in our case two) must exceed the
verification threshold of the FRS. Further, in this work, we
set the operating threshold of both COTS FRS to FAR =
0.1% following the guidelines of FRONTEX [17] for au-
tomated border control. Thus, we coin the new realistic
constraint using a new vulnerability metric as Fully Mated
Morphed Presentation Match Rate (FMMPMR) that can be
computed as:
(1)FMMPMR
=
1
P
∑
M,P
(S1PM > τ)AND(S2
P
M > τ) . . . AND(Sk
P
M > τ)
Where P = 1, 2, . . . , p represent the number of attempts
made by presenting all the probe images from the contribut-
ing subject against M th morphed image, K = 1, 2, . . . , k
represents the number of contributing data subjects to the
constitution of the generated morphed image (in our case
K = 2), SkPM represents the comparison score of the K
th
contributing subject obtained with P th attempt (in our case
the P th probe image from the dataset) corresponding to
M th morph image and τ represents the threshold value cor-
responding to FAR = 0.1%.
We have employed the new metric FMMPMR con-
sidering the fact that the existing vulnerability metric
MMPMR[40] considers only the morphed images getting
verified with the contributing subjects without taking into
account the number of times/attempts. However, the new
metric FMMPMR overcomes this drawback and considers
each and every time a morphed images gets verified to the
1Outcome not necessarily constitutes the best the algorithm can do
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Figure 4: Scatter and Box plots obtained using Cognitech FRS on MorphAge-I dataset
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Figure 5: Scatter and Box plots obtained using Neurotech FRS on MorphAge-I dataset
I and MorphAge-II. Figure 5 and Figure 4 shows the
scatter plot and box plot for MorphAge-I dataset from
two COTS FRS respectively. Figure 4a,4b, 4c and Fig-
ure 5a,5b, 5c provides the visualization of the compar-
ison scores when the morphed image is enrolled, and
both composite data subjects are probed for both FRS.
In ideal conditions, the FRS is vulnerable to morphing
attacks with the proviso all the obtained comparison
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Figure 4: Scatter and Box plots obtained using COTS-I FRS
on MorphAge-I dataset
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I and MorphAge-II. Figure 5 and Figure 4 shows the
scatter plot and box plot for MorphAge-I dataset from
two COTS FRS respectively. Figure 4a,4b, 4c and Fig-
ure 5a,5b, 5c provides the visualization of the compar-
ison scores when the morphed image is enrolled, and
both composite data subjects are probed for both FRS.
In ideal conditions, the FRS is vulnerable to morphing
attacks with the proviso all the obtained comparison
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Figure 5: Scatter and Box plots obtained using COTS-II
FRS on MorphAge-I dataset
pair of contributing subject thus reflecting the actual vulner-
ability of a FRS.
Table 2: Experiment-I: Quantitative performance of the
MAD techniques on MorphAge-I
Algorithm
Development Testing set
Set
EER (%) EER (%) BPCER (%) @ APCER (%) =
1 5 10
Morphing factor 0.3
LBP-SVM [36, 46, 16, 41] 28.14 35.11 84.4 68.8 56.8
BSIF-SVM [36, 41] 31.82 37.59 98.8 90 73.2
HOG-SVM citeScher2017 32.09 33.51 84.4 63.6 53.6
AlexNet-SVM [16, 38, 44] 4.38 2 7.2 3.2 0.8
Color Denoising [47] 1.63 3.65 5.2 0.4 0.4
Morphing factor 0.5
LBP-SVM [36, 46, 16, 41] 27.82 33.76 75.2 59.2 57.2
BSIF-SVM [36, 41] 31.82 36.9 98.8 89.21 73.6
HOG-SVM [41] 30.73 34.1 81.2 63.2 56.8
AlexNet-SVM [16, 38, 44] 3.18 2.01 4.12 0 0
Color Denoising [47] 1.63 1.21 7.6 0.4 0
Morphing factor 0.7
LBP-SVM [36, 46, 16, 41] 28.86 34.92 88.4 66.8 57.2
BSIF-SVM [36, 41] 31.9 37.98 98.8 88 73.2
HOG-SVM [41] 32.98 33.38 80 62.8 57.2
AlexNet-SVM [16, 38, 44] 5.08 2.78 5.6 2 0
Color Denoising [47] 2.75 2.43 13.2 2 0.4
Table 3 indicates the FMMPMR (%) computed using the
two COTS FRS on both bins - MorphAge-I and MorphAge-
II. Figure 4 and Figure 5 shows the scatter plot and box
plot for MorphAge-I dataset from two COTS FRS respec-
tively. Figure 4(a), 4(b), 4(c) and Figure 5(a), 5(b), 5(c)
provides the visualization of the comparison scores when
the morphed image is enrolled, and both contributing data
subjects are probed for both FRS. In the most serve condi-
tions, meaning a high vulnerability of the FRS with regards
to morphing attacks, we will obtain comparison scores that
are clustered in the top right corner of the figure. The ver-
tical and horizontal lines indicate the threshold that is rec-
ommended by the COTS FRS for operational settings in the
border control application corresponding to FMR = 0.1%.
Figure 4(d), 4(e), 4(f) and 5(d), 5(e), 5(f) shows the box
plot that provides insight on the distributions of comparison
scores corresponding to the contributor probe images allow-
ing us to understand which of the two probe images (of the
contributing subjects) are more vulnerable for the FRS. In
similar lines, Figure 6 and 7 shows the scatter plot and box
plot for the MorphAge-II dataset that are computed from the
two COTS FRS. Based on the obtained results the following
are our main observations:
• Intra-Age Groups: As expected the morphed image with
the morphing factor of 0.5 indicates the highest vulnera-
bility as reflected by both COTS FRS. However, the mor-
phing factor of 0.3 and 0.7 indicates a reduced vulnerabil-
ity that can be attributed to the morphing factor weights
leaning toward only one of the contributing data subjects.
This fact is illustrated in Figure 4, 5, 6 and 7, where we
can observe that with a morphing factor of 0.3, the subject
1 is likely to be verified. While with a morphing factor of
0.7, in most cases, subject 2 is likely to be verified rather
than subject 1. While not so surprising, the morphing
factor of 0.5 indicates (almost) equally both contributing
subjects can be verified.
• Inter-Age groups: Based on the obtained results, it is also
interesting to note the direct influence on the morphing
factor on the vulnerability. Thus, with the morphing fac-
tor of 0.3 and 0.7, both COTS FRS shows a greater reduc-
tion value of FMMPMR on MorphAge-II dataset. This
indicates morphing attacks pose lesser threats to FRS un-
der the influence of ageing. However, with the morphed
factor of 0.5, the COTS-II FRS indicates lower values of
FMMPMR, while COTS-I indicates a moderate reduction
in the vulnerability despite being very significant.
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Figure 7: Scatter and Box plots obtained using Cognitech FRS on MorphAge-II dataset
scores are clustered on the top right corner of the graph.
The vertical and horizontal lines indicate the threshold
that is recommended by the COTS FRS in operational
settings at border control corresponding to FAR = 1%.
Figure 4d,4e, 4f and Figure 5d,5e, 5f shows the box plot
that can provide insights on the distributions of com-
parison scores corresponding to the composite images
that allows us to understand which of the two com-
posite subjects are more vulnerable in FRS. In similar
lines, Figure 6 and 7 shows the scatter plot and box
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Fig r 6: Scatter and Box lots obt ined using COTS-I FRS
on MorphAge-II dataset
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scores are clustered on the top right corner of the graph.
The vertical and horizontal lines indicate the threshold
that is recommended by the COTS FRS in operational
settings at border control corresponding to FAR = 1%.
Figure 4d,4e, 4f and Figure 5d,5e, 5f shows the box plot
that can provide insights on the distributions of com-
parison scores corresponding to the composite images
that allows us to understand which of the two com-
posite subjects are more vulnerable in FRS. In similar
lines, Figure 6 and 7 shows the scatter plot and box
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Figure 7: Scatter and Box plots obtained using COTS-II
FRS on MorphAge-II dataset
• Observing the box plots for the morphing factor of
0.5 from both MorphAge-I and MorphAge-II, it can be
noted that, both the median and whiskers correspond-
ing to the comparison scores from both subjects are re-
duced in MorphAge-II when compared to MorphAge-I.
These observations, together with the quantitative value
of FMMPMR, indicate the reduced threats to morphing
attacks on FRS under ageing. This fact is consistently ob-
served for both COTS FRS and are statistically significant
as observed in the box plots.
• Role of COTS FRS: The COTS-I FRS indicates the high-
est vulnerability on three morphing factors when com-
pared to that of the COTS-II FRS. The morphing factor
with 0.5 shows the highest FMMPMR with 95.55% on
MorphAge-I and 93.81% on MorphAge-II with COTS-I
FRS. The lowest value of FMMPMR is noted with COTS-
II FRS with a morphing factor of 0.7 in the MorphAge-II
dataset.
Table 3: Vulnerability analysis: FMMPMR (%)
Morphing factor
FMMPMR(%)
MorphAge-I MorphAge-II
COTS-I COTS-II COTS-I COTS-II
0.3 66.24 6.75 58.47 17.29
0.5 95.07 61.81 93.81 56.27
0.7 67.32 18.21 100 48.32
4. Face Morph Attack Detection Performance
In this section, we benchmark the most recent digital
MAD techniques on the newly created MorphAge dataset.
The goal of this experiment is to understand the impact
of ageing on the detection performance of the MAD tech-
niques. To this extent, we design two different experiments
Table 4: Experiment-I: Quantitative performance of the
MAD techniques on MorphAge-II
Algorithm
Development Testing set
Set
EER (%) EER (%) BPCER (%) @ APCER (%) =
1 5 10
Morphing factor 0.3
LBP-SVM [36, 46, 16, 41] 30.64 29.21 61.24 48.83 44.96
BSIF-SVM [36, 41] 33.35 39.17 58.91 51.16 48.83
HOG-SVM [41] 32.56 32.56 66.66 51.93 45.73
AlexNet-SVM [16, 38, 44] 4 5.49 7.75 4.65 4.65
Color Denoising [47] 3.15 1.7 3.1 0 0
Morphing factor 0.5
LBP-SVM [36, 46, 16, 41] 28.71 32.39 68.99 48.06 41.08
BSIF-SVM [36, 41] 32.65 39 63.56 51.16 48.83
HOG-SVM [41] 30.33 32.56 62.02 52.71 44.96
AlexNet-SVM [16, 38, 44] 2.92 3.78 6.2 3.87 3.11
Color Denoising [47] 3.77 0.75 1.55 0.77 0.77
Morphing factor 0.7
LBP-SVM [36, 46, 16, 41] 29.33 27.03 58.91 51.98 45.73
BSIF-SVM [36, 41] 34.7 33.07 58.91 51.16 48.06
HOG-SVM [41] 31.02 29.09 73.64 58.91 44.96
AlexNet-SVM [16, 38, 44] 3.15 5.5 11.62 5.42 4.65
Color Denoising [47] 3.15 0.75 3.1 0 0
to reflect the variation in the performance of the MAD tech-
niques under the influence of ageing. Experiment-I: the
evaluation protocol is designed to evaluate the MAD detec-
tors in the same age group. Thus, the MAD detectors are
trained and tested with the same group data. Experiment-
II: is designed to evaluate the performance of MAD detec-
tion with the variation in age. Thus, MAD detectors are
trained with the MorphAge-I data and tested with only the
MorphAge-II dataset. In both experiments, the correspond-
ing development dataset is used to tune the parameters of
the algorithm and also to compute the operating threshold
at APCER = 1%, 5% and 10%. In this work, we have eval-
uated five different MAD schemes such as: Local Binary
Pattern (LBP) LBP-SVM [36, 46, 16, 41], Binarized Statis-
tical Image Features (BSIF) [36, 41], Histogram of Oriented
Gradients (HOG) [41], AlexNet [16, 38, 44] and Color De-
noising [47]. We have considered these five MAD tech-
niques as they have indicated good performance on three
different large scale digital morphing datasets [47]. The
quantitative results are presented according to the ISO/IEC
30107-3 [20] metrics such as Bona fide Presentation Clas-
sification Error Rate (BPCER(%)) and Attack Presenta-
tion Classification Error Rate (APCER (%)) along with D-
EER(%).
Table 2 and 4 indicates the quantitative results of the
MAD schemes on two different age groups MorphAge-I
and MorphAge-II respectively on the Experiment-I proto-
col. Based on the obtained results, it can be noticed that:
• The traditional MAD methods based on LBP, BSIF, and
HOG fail to indicate acceptable detection performance
for the both MorphAge-I and the MorphAge-II dataset.
• Recently introduced MAD techniques based on AlexNet
and Color denoising techniques have shown excellent per-
formance in detecting morphing attacks.
• It is interesting to note that the MAD methods do not
show any influence of the different morphing factors on
the detection performance. The detection performance
with different morphing factor did further not vary irre-
spective of the age group as well.
• Among the five benchmarked different MAD tech-
niques, the color denoising MAD has indicated the best
performance across various morphing factors for both
MorphAge-I and MorphAge-II.
Table 5 indicates the quantitative detection performance
of MAD methods in Experiment-II. Based on the obtained
results, it can be noted that the ageing does not influence
the performance of the MAD methods. It is worth not-
ing that, in this protocol, MAD methods are trained using
only MorphAge-I dataset and are tested on the MorphAge-
II dataset with the age difference up to 5 years. Further, the
data subjects in MorphAge-I and MorphAge-II do not over-
lap. Among the five different MAD methods, color denois-
ing based MAD has again indicated the best performance
for all three morphing factors. Further, as it can be de-
duced, ageing does not influence the detection capabilities
of MAD.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we have presented an empirical study on
quantifying the vulnerability of COTS FRS with regards to
morphing attacks under the influence of ageing. We have
introduced a new dataset with two different age groups de-
rived from the publicly available MORPH II face dataset
referred as MorphAge-I and MorphAge-II. Further, we
have also introduced a new evaluation metric namely, Fully
Table 5: Experiment-II: Quantitative detection performance
of MAD techniques on MorphAge-I v/s. MorphAge-II
Algorithm
Development Testing set
Set
EER (%) EER (%) BPCER (%) @ APCER (%) =
1 5 10
Morphing factor 0.3
LBP-SVM [36, 46, 16, 41] 28.14 34.19 92.24 65.89 47.28
BSIF-SVM [36, 41] 31.82 44.13 100 98.44 84.49
HOG-SVM [41] 32.09 41.86 91.47 70.54 62.01
AlexNet-SVM [16, 38, 44] 4.38 3.03 8.52 3.10 2.32
Color Denoising [47] 1.63 2.27 1.55 0.45 0
Morphing factor 0.5
LBP-SVM [36, 46, 16, 41] 27.82 33.29 86.04 66.66 48.06
BSIF-SVM [36, 41] 31.82 45.42 100 96.89 84.49
HOG-SVM [41] 30.73 37.95 85.27 67.44 57.36
AlexNet-SVM [16, 38, 44] 3.18 0.94 3.10 0.77 0.39
Color Denoising [47] 1.63 1.59 0.7 0 0
Morphing factor 0.7
LBP-SVM [36, 46, 16, 41] 28.86 32.24 93.20 65.89 49.61
BSIF-SVM [36, 41] 31.90 37.33 100 96.89 84.49
HOG-SVM [41] 32.98 33.54 88.37 68.99 58.13
AlexNet-SVM [16, 38, 44] 5.08 2.27 6.97 3.87 0.77
Color Denoising [47] 2.75 2.46 3.10 0.40 0
Mated Morphed Presentation Match Rate (FMMPMR) to
quantify the vulnerability effectively. Extensive experi-
ments were carried out using two different COTS FRS and
three various morphing factors (with α = 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7).
Based on the obtained results, it is observed that impact
of ageing reduces the vulnerability from morphing attacks
on COTS FRS. The reduction in the vulnerability is more
prominent when the morphing factor is choose as α = 0.3
and 0.7. However and with a morphing factor of α = 0.5, the
vulnerability did not change significantly with the COTS-I,
while COTS-II FRS still indicates a significant reduction in
the vulnerability.
Further, extensive experiments were performed to quan-
tify the performance variation of the MAD methods under
the influence of ageing. To this extent, three different evalu-
ation protocols are presented that show no influence of age-
ing on morph attack detection performance. It is also inter-
esting to note that robust MAD methods are not sensitive to
variations of the morphing factor even under the influence
of ageing.
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